Description
This volume offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology, in the form of twelve new essays by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, skepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic,and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.

Table Contents

Part One, KNOWLEDGE
1. Hilary Kornblith: Knowledge Needs No Justification
2. Peter Klein: Useful Falsehoods
Part Two, EVIDENCE AND JUSTIFICATION
3. Alvin Goldman: Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism
4. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman: Evidence
5. Anthony Brueckner: Experiential Justification
Part Three, SOLIPSISM
6. Ernest Sosa: Skepticism and Perceptual Knowledge
7. Marian David and Ted A. Warfield: Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism
Part Four, MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
8. George Bealer: Modal Error
9. Robert Audi: Rational Disagreement as a Challenge to Practical Ethics and Moral Theory: An Essay in Moral Epistemology
Part Five, EPISTEMOLOGY OF RATIONALITY, PROBABILITY, AND NONFORMAL INFERENCES
10. John Pollock: Irrationality and Cognition
11. Timothy Williamson: Why Epistemology can't be Operationalized
12. Panayot Butchvarov: Epistemology Dehumanized